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Abstract—The use of autonomous vehicles (AVs) is a promising
technology in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) to im-
prove safety and driving efficiency. Vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
technology enables communication among vehicles and other
infrastructures. However, AVs and Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
are vulnerable to different types of cyber-attacks such as denial
of service, spoofing, and sniffing attacks. In this paper, an
intelligent intrusion detection system (IDS) is proposed based
on tree-structure machine learning models. The results from the
implementation of the proposed intrusion detection system on
standard data sets indicate that the system has the ability to
identify various cyber-attacks in the AV networks. Furthermore,
the proposed ensemble learning and feature selection approaches
enable the proposed system to achieve high detection rate and
low computational cost simultaneously.
Index Terms—intrusion detection system, CAN bus, VANET,
autonomous vehicles, random forest, XGBoost, stacking, cyber
security
I. INTRODUCTION
With more vehicles, devices, and infrastructures involved,
the conventional vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are
gradually evolving into the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) [1].
In intelligent transportation systems (ITSs), VANETs en-
able wireless communications between vehicles and de-
vices, then transform the vehicles and devices into wire-
less routers or mobile nodes [2]. Autonomous vehicles
(AV) technology is a fast-paced technology which pro-
vides an ideal solution to reduce traffic collisions and re-
lated costs. Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) [2] technology is
at the core of AV, consisting of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V),
Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I),
and Vehicle-to-Network (V2N) technologies to enable local
and wide area cellular network communications between
vehicles, pedestrians, and infrastructures.
V2X technology, with the means of wireless communica-
tions, aims to involve more Internet of things (IoT) devices.
However, some of these devices lack security mechanisms
such as firewalls and gateways [3]. AVs are prone to net-
work threats with severe consequences because attacking or
maliciously controlling the vehicles on the road poses serious
threat to human lives. The potential networking threats include
the following attacks. A common type of attack is Denial of
services (DoS) attacks launched by sending a large number
of irrelevant messages or requests to occupy the node and
take control of the resources of the vehicle [4]. The attackers
perform spoofing attacks such as GPS spoofing to masquerade
as legitimate users and provide the nodes with fake GPS
information [4]. Sniffing attacks such as port scan attacks is
another type of attack, which is launched to obtain confidential
or sensitive data of the vehicles systems and users [5]. In
addition, brute-force attacks are launched by attackers to crack
passwords in the vehicle networks or systems [5]. To intrude
into the web interface of vehicles or servers, web attacks
including SQL injection attacks and cross-site scripting (XSS)
can also be implemented by the attackers [5].
Apart from external communication threats, AVs are also
prone to intra-vehicle communication attacks. Controller Area
Network (CAN) [6] is a bus communication protocol which
enables in-vehicle communications between all Electronic
Control Units (ECUs). It provides an efficient error detection
mechanism for stable transmission and can reduce wiring
cost, weight, and complexity [6]. However, all the ECUs
communicate with each other through the CAN bus, which
makes the ECUs vulnerable to various attacks if the CAN
bus is compromised. In CAN bus communications, attackers
can inject malicious messages to monitor the network traffic
or launch other hostile attacks and the nodes will inevitably
deal with the messages without validating their origins. The
message injection attacks on CAN bus can be classified by
their aims. Similar to external networks, DoS and spoofing
attacks can also be launched on the CAN bus to occupy the
resources or provide malicious information such as gear and
RPM (revolutions per minute) information. In addition, fuzzy
attacks are another common type of attack launched on CAN
bus by injecting arbitrary messages to cause the vehicles to
show unintended states or malfunction [7].
All the above vulnerabilities and threats call for a robust
protection system that can repel possible attacks that pose
threats to intra-vehicle and external communications in AV
systems. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are an effective
security mechanism to identify the abnormal information and
attacks through the network traffic data during the communi-
cation between vehicles and other devices. Intrusion detection
is often considered as a classification problem; machine learn-
ing (ML) methods have been widely used to develop IDSs
[8]. An intelligent IDS is proposed in this paper for network
attack detection that can be applied to not only Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus of AVs but also on general IoVs.
The proposed IDS utilizes tree-based ML algorithms including
decision tree (DT), random forest (RF), extra trees (ET),
and Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost). A qualified IDS
needs to not only achieve a high detection rate, but also have
a low computational cost. Therefore, an ensemble learning
model, namely stacking, is used to improve accuracy and
the feature selection methods are also implemented to reduce
computational time. The performance of the proposed IDS is
evaluated using multiple standard open-source data sets with
results showing high accuracy in detecting intrusions.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Surveys the vulnerabilities and potential attacks in CAN
and AV networks.
• Proposes an intelligent IDS for both AV and general
networks by using the tree structure ML and ensemble
learning methods.
• Presents a comprehensive framework to prepare network
traffic data for the purpose of IDS development.
• Proposes an averaging feature selection method using
tree structure ML models to improve the efficiency of
the proposed IDS and to perform an analysis of network
attributes and attacks for network monitoring uses.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
system overview of the proposed IDS and its architecture.
Section III discusses the proposed IDS framework in detail.
Section IV provides the results, performance comparison and
feature analysis. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. Problem statement
Due to the fact that the AV systems are vulnerable to many
types of network threats through different communication
mediums, a comprehensive IDS system is proposed to be im-
plemented for both intra-vehicle and external communication
networks. This is done to better protect not only the vehicle
components but also all the IoT devices involved in the entire
IoV.
The proposed IDS should be able to detect various common
intrusions launched on CAN bus and external networks. The
main attacks to be considered in this work include DoS
attacks on both the intra-vehicle and external communication
networks, fuzzy attacks and spoofing attacks on the CAN-bus,
sniffing, brute force and web attacks launched on the external
networks. The IDS should have a high detection rate to
effectively identify most of the attacks and low computational
time to improve efficiency.
B. IDS system overview and architecture
To provide protection for both the intra-vehicle and external
communications, the proposed IDS is implemented in multiple
locations within the AV system. To detect threats on the
CAN bus and secure it, the IDS can be placed on the top
of the CAN bus to process every transmitted message and
ensure the nodes are not compromised [9]. Alternatively, the
proposed IDS can be placed inside the gateway to secure the
Fig. 1. The proposed IDS-protected AV architecture
Fig. 2. The proposed IDS framework
external communication networks [10]. The topology of IDS
implementation on vehicle systems is shown in Fig. 1.
On the CAN bus, all the nodes are linked, and when a node
receives a message mainly consisting of an ID and data field
sent by another device connected to the CAN bus, the message
is passed through the IDS to check when the signal line of the
CAN bus changes from CANH to CANL. Similarly, when a
message is transmitted from external network to intranet, it is
passed through the IDS inside the gateway and checked.
To design the IDS, Fig. 2 provides an overview of the tree-
based ML classification framework for intrusion detection.
The process of the proposed model is as follows. Firstly, suffi-
cient network traffic data is collected. Secondly, if the classes
of the data set are imbalanced, oversampling is implemented to
reduce its impact. At the next stage, feature selection based on
averaging feature importance is done to reduce computational
cost. After that, four base-models are built to be the input of
the stacking ensemble model. At the end, the final model is
built to classify the data.
III. PROPOSED IDS FRAMEWORK
A. Data pre-processing
The first step to develop an IDS is to collect sufficient
amount of network traffic data under both the normal state and
the abnormal state caused by different types of attacks. The
data can be collected by the packet sniffers, but they should
have suitable network attributes, or named network features,
for the purpose of IDS development.
Firstly, to design an IDS for CAN bus intrusion, since the
main CAN bus threats are message injection attacks, the data
of CAN messages/frames should be collected and the main
features correlated to attacks are CAN IDs and the data field
of frames [7].
Regarding the external networks, since they belong to gen-
eral networks and are prone to various regular network threats,
the data with more network attributes should be collected
to develop an effective IDS that can detect various types of
cyber-attacks. Most of the regular network attributes such as
packet length, data transfer rate, throughput, inter-arrival time,
flags of TCP and their counts, segment size, and active/idle
time should be considered [5]. However, the computational
complexity of the proposed IDS may increase dramatically
due to the high data dimensionality. Thus, further feature
analysis should be done for the external network data.
The collected network data would be pre-processed after a
few steps to be better suited for IDS development purpose.
Firstly, the data can be encoded with one-hot-vector because
it has a certain threshold to help separate normal data and
anomalies [6]. On the other hand, ML training is often more
efficient with normalized data [3]. Thus, each feature with
numerical values is set to the range of 0.0 to 1.0, and each
value after normalization xn is indicated as:
xn =
x−min
max−min, (1)
where x is the original value,max andmin are the maximum
and minimum values of each feature.
In addition, network data are often class imbalanced be-
cause in real life, networks maintain the normal state most of
the time and the attack-label instances are often not enough.
To overcome the issue of class-imbalanced data which often
results in a low anomaly detection rate, random oversampling
and Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE)
[11] can be used to generate more data in the minority classes
that do not have enough data. The basic strategy of random
oversampling is to simply make multiple copies of the samples
to increase samples in the minority classes. However, the
random oversampling method can easily result in over-fitting
because the information learned would be very specific instead
of generic. On the other hand, the SMOTE algorithm analyzes
the minority classes and generates new samples based on them
by using the idea of K nearest neighbors. Therefore, SMOTE
can generate high-quality samples and is used for the minority
classes in the proposed system.
B. The proposed ML approaches
In the proposed system, to detect various cyber-attacks,
developing the IDS can be considered as a multi-classification
problem, and machine learning algorithms are widely used to
solve such classification problems [12] [13]. The selected ML
algorithms are based on tree structure, including decision tree,
random forest, extra trees, and XGBoost.
Decision tree (DT) [14] is a common classification method
based on divide and conquer strategy. A DT comprises de-
cision nodes and leaf nodes, and they represent a decision
test over one of the features, and the result class, respectively.
Random forest (RF) [15] is an ensemble learning classifier
based on the majority voting rule that the class with the highest
votes by decision trees is selected to be the classification
result. Similarly, extra trees (ET) [16] is another ensemble
model based on a collection of randomized decision trees
generated by processing different subsets of data set. In
contrast, XGBoost [17] is a ensemble learning algorithm
designed for speed and performance improvement by using
the gradient descent method to combine many decision trees.
Apart from the proposed algorithms, other models such as
K-nearest neighbor (KNN) and support vector machine (SVM)
[18] are also common for classification problems. For the
purpose of model selection, the computational complexity of
common supervised ML algorithms is calculated. Assuming
the number of training instances is N , the number of features
is P , and the number of trees is T , we have the following
approximations. The complexity of DT is O(N2P ) while
the complexity of RF is O(N2
√
PT ). In addition, ET and
XGBoost have a similar complexity of O(NPT ). On the other
hand, KNN’s complexity is O(NP ) and the SVM algorithms
complexity is O(N2P ) [12] [19]. However, unlike KNN and
SVM, the proposed four tree-based models, DT, RF, ET,
and XGBoost, enable multi-threading to save training time.
Assuming the maximum number of participating threads of
a computer is M , the time complexity of DT, RF, ET, and
XGBoost reduces to O(N
2P
M
), O(N
2
√
PT
M
), O(NPT
M
), and
O(NPT
M
), respectively. Therefore, although the original time
complexity of the considered algorithms are similar, the four
tree structure algorithms have lower computational time due
to multi-threading, which is an important reason for choosing
these four algorithms.
The other reasons for choosing these algorithms are as
follows: 1) Most of the tree structure ML models are using
ensemble learning so they often show better performance
than other single models such as KNN. 2) They have the
ability to handle non-linear and high dimensional data that the
proposed network data belongs to. 3) The feature importance
calculations are done during the building process of those
models, which is beneficial when performing feature selection.
It is noteworthy that there are some hyper-parameters of
the proposed algorithms that need be tuned to achieve better
performance. For the DT algorithm, the split measure function
is set to be Gini impurity, and the classification and regres-
sion trees (CART) model is then built, which shows better
performance than using information gain theory to build an
ID3 tree. Assuming that S denotes the set of all sub-trees,
CART selects the tree in S that minimizes [14]:
C(S) = Lˆn(S) + α|S|, (2)
where |S| is the cardinality of the tree, α is a constant
and Lˆn(S) is the empirical risk using the tree S. Since the
deeper tree has more sub-trees, tree depth D is an important
parameter of the CART algorithm.
For RF and ET, since their results are based on the majority
voting of many decision trees, the number of decision trees
T is another important parameter affecting the performance.
T could also be tuned in XGBoost which is also based
on the ensemble of numerous trees. Specifically, XGBoost
minimizes the following regularized objective function [17]:
Obj = −1
2
t∑
j=1
G2j
Hj + λ
+ γt, (3)
where G and H represent the sums of the first and second
order gradient statistics of the loss function, t is the number of
leaves in a decision tree, λ and γ are the penalty coefficients.
Since the gradient statistics are based on the sum of the
predicted scores of the T trees, and the number of leaves
increases with the increase of the tree depth D, T and D have
direct impacts on the objective function value of XGBoost.
If the parameters T and D are too small, it leads to under-
fitting and if they are too large, it causes over-fitting and
additional computational costs.
The grid search method [20] is utilized to find the optimal
values. To be precise, the training of the models starts from
a small number of trees and a short depth. Then, these two
values are slowly increased with accuracy evaluated until over-
fitting, which is indicated by the dropping of accuracy. Finally,
the tree depth D is tuned to 8 and the number of trees T is
set to 200. Similarly, the minimum sample split and minimum
sample leaf are both tuned from 1 to 10, and finally set to 8
and 3, respectively. Note that the parameter tuning process can
be further improved by using other optimization techniques.
C. Ensemble learning and feature selection
For the purpose of further accuracy improvement, an en-
semble learning technique, stacking, is implemented. Stacking
[21] is a common ensemble method consisting of two layers
where the first layer contains a few trained base predictors,
and their output serves as the input of a meta-learner in the
second layer to build a strong classifier. The four trained tree
structure algorithms serve as the base models in the first layer
of the stacking ensemble method, and the singular algorithm
with highest accuracy among the four base models is selected
to be the meta-classifier in the second layer.
To improve the confidence of the selected features, an
ensemble feature selection (FS) technique is utilized by cal-
culating the average of feature importance lists generated by
the four selected tree-based ML models. They are chosen for
feature selection because tree-based algorithms calculate the
importance of each feature based on each single tree, and then
average the output of the trees to make the result more reliable.
Additionally, different traditional feature selection methods
such as information gain, entropy, and Gini coefficient are
utilized in the system by setting different parameters in tree-
based methods to generate the convincing feature importance.
The sum of the total feature importance is 1.0. To select
features, the features are ranked with their importance and
each feature is added into the feature list from high importance
to low importance till the sum of importance reaches 0.9. The
other features with the sum of importance less than 0.1 will
be discarded to reduce the computational costs.
D. Validation metrics
Each considered data set is split into five subsets and 5-
fold cross-validation is implemented to evaluate the proposed
models. Accuracy (Acc), detection rate (DR)/recall, false
alarm rate (FAR), and F1 score are the main metrics used to
evaluate the proposed method, with their formulas proposed
in [22]. The accuracy is the proportion of correctly classified
data. However, the data sets may exhibit class imbalance,
resulting in a high accuracy of normal data classification but
a low attack detection rate. Thus, the detection rate, the ratio
between the detected attack data and the total abnormal data,
is also calculated for evaluation. A qualified IDS should have
a high DR to ensure most of the attacks can be detected and
a low FAR to confirm the system does not misreport data
for higher DR [15]. In addition, the F1 score considers both
the precision and recall by calculating their harmonic average,
which can be used to evaluate the overall performance of the
methods. Also, the execution time, mainly the model training
time, is used to provide insights into the computational
performance.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Datasets description
To evaluate the proposed IDS, this work considers two
different datasets for the purpose of its implementation in both
intra-vehicle and external networks as described in Section
III-A. The first data set is called ”Car-Hacking Dataset” or
”CAN-intrusion dataset” which was proposed in 2018 for
the purpose of IDS development on CAN bus [6]. On the
other hand, to build a comprehensive IDS that can also
be effective in external communication networks, a standard
IDS data set containing the most updated attack scenarios,
named ”CICIDS2017” [5], is considered in this work. The
features of the two selected data sets meet our requirements
proposed in Section III-A. To prepare better datasets for the
TABLE I
DATA TYPE AND SIZE OF THE CAN-INTRUSIONDATASET
Class label Number of
instances
Class label Number of
instances
Normal 14,037,293 RPM spoofing 654,897
DoS 587,521 Gear spoofing 597,252
Fuzzy 491,847 - -
TABLE II
DATA TYPE AND SIZE OF THE CICIDS2017 DATASET
Class label Number of
instances
Class label Number of
instances
BENIGN 2,273,097 Web-Attack 2,180
DoS 380,699 Botnet 1,966
Port-Scan 158,930 Infiltration 36
Brute-Force 13,835 - -
IDS development, minor tasks including data combination,
missing value removal and new label assignments were done
for both datasets based on the methods proposed in [23]. The
specifics of the improved datasets are shown in Table I and
II.
B. IDS performance analysis
The proposed system was implemented using Python 3.5
and the experiments were carried out on a machine with 6
Core i7-8700 processor and 16 GB of memory.
The results of testing different algorithms on CAN-intrusion
data set and CICIDS2017 data set are shown in Tables III and
IV, respectively. According to Table III, when testing on the
CAN-intrusion data set, the tree-based algorithms including
DT, RF, ET, and XGBoost used in the proposed system are
2.5% more accurate than KNN and 3.4% more accurate than
SVM used in [8]. In addition, multi-threading is enabled in
DT, RF, ET, and XGBoost, resulting in a lower execution time
compared with KNN and SVM. Since XGBoost has the lowest
accuracy and longest execution time among the four tree-based
ML models, only the other three algorithms, DT, RF, and
ET were selected into the stacking ensemble model, and the
single model with best performance, RF, was selected to be
the meta-classifier in the second layer. After using stacking to
combine the three tree-based models, the accuracy, detection
rate and F1 score reaches 100%, which means that all the
trained attacks can be detected.
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF IDS ON CAN-INTRUSION DATASET
Method Acc
(%)
DR
(%)
FAR
(%)
F1
Score
Execution
Time (S)
KNN [8] 97.4 96.3 5.3 0.934 911.6
SVM [8] 96.5 95.7 4.8 0.933 13765.6
DT 99.99 99.99 0.006 0.999 328
RF 99.99 99.99 0.0003 0.999 506.8
ET 99.99 99.99 0.0005 0.999 216.3
XGBoost 99.98 99.98 0.012 0.999 3499.1
Stacking 100 100 0.0 1.0 1237.1
FS RF 99.99 99.99 0.0013 0.999 99.6
FS Stacking 99.99 99.99 0.0006 0.999 325.6
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF IDS ON CICIDS2017 DATASET
Method Acc
(%)
DR
(%)
FAR
(%)
F1
Score
Execution
Time (S)
KNN [5] 96.6 96.4 5.6 0.966 9243.6
SVM [24] 98.01 97.58 1.48 0.978 49953.1
DT 99.72 99.3 0.029 0.998 126.7
RF 98.37 98.29 0.039 0.983 2421.6
ET 93.43 93.35 0.001 0.934 2349.6
XGBoost 99.78 99.76 0.069 0.997 1637.2
Stacking 99.86 99.8 0.012 0.998 4519.3
FS XGBoost 99.7 99.55 0.077 0.996 995.9
FS Stacking 99.82 99.75 0.011 0.997 2774.8
Similarly in CICIDS2017 data set, as shown in Table IV,
most of the used tree-based algorithms shows 1.8-3.2% higher
accuracy, detection rate and F1 score than KNN [5] and
SVM [24] except for ET. Hence, only DT, RF, and XGBoost
were chosen in the proposed stacking method, and XGBoost
was selected to be the meta-classifier of the stacking model.
Although the execution time of stacking is longer than any
singular tree-based models, it reaches the highest accuracy
among the models (99.86%).
After training the data sets with all the features to obtain the
highest performance, the feature selection method proposed
in Section III-C was implemented to reduce execution time.
From Tables III and IV, it can be seen that RF and XGBoost
are the singular models with best accuracy on CAN-intrusion
data set and CICIDS2017 data set, respectively. As single
base models have lower execution time than the ensemble
model, these two singular models were also tested after feature
selection. For CAN-intrusion data set, the top-4 important
features, CAN ID, ’DATA[5]’, ’DATA[3]’, ’DATA[1]’ were
selected for the tests. The results of RF and stacking on CAN-
intrusion data set after feature selection, named ”FS RF” and
”FS Stacking”, can be seen from Table III. It shows that
the RF and stacking models saved 80.3% and 73.7% of the
execution time after feature selection, respectively, while still
maintaining a high accuracy (99.99%). For CICIDS2017 data
set, 36 out of 78 features were selected and the accuracy of
XGBoost and stacking models only decreased by 0.08% and
0.04% while saving 39.2% and 38.6% of the execution time,
respectively, as shown in Table IV. Therefore, the tree-based
averaging feature selection method enables the IDS to save
execution time while maintaining high accuracy.
C. Feature analysis
In order to analyze the features, the proposed feature
selection method was tested on the subsets of each attack.
The list of top-3 important features and their corresponding
weights of each attack is shown in Table V. As Table V shows,
the destination port can reflect a DoS, brute force, web attack,
and botnet attack. The size of packets is another important
feature. For example, the average packet size indicates a DoS
attack, port scan attack, and web attack. The packet length in
the forward direction is related to port scan, brute-force, and
infiltration attacks, while the packet length in the backward
TABLE V
TOP-3 FEATURE IMPORTANCE BY EACH ATTACK
Label Feature Weight
Bwd Packet Length Std 0.1723
DoS Average Packet Size 0.1211
Destination Port 0.0785
Total Length of Fwd Packets 0.3020
Port-Scan Average Packet Size 0.1045
PSH Flag Count 0.1019
Destination Port 0.3728
Brute-Force Fwd Packet Length Min 0.1022
Packet Length Variance 0.0859
Init Win bytes backward 0.2643
Web-Attack Average Packet Size 0.1650
Destination Port 0.0616
Destination Port 0.2364
Botnet Bwd Packet Length Mean 0.1240
Avg Bwd Segment Size 0.1104
Total Length of Fwd Packets 0.2298
Infiltration Subflow Fwd Bytes 0.1345
Destination Port 0.1149
direction reflects a DoS, web attack, and botnet. In addition,
the variance of the length of the packets in both forward and
backward directions reflects the brute force attack, and the
count of pushing flags indicates port scan attack. After getting
the feature importance list of each attack, the IDSs with other
aims like designing a dedicated system for detecting a single
type of attack can be developed by selecting the important
features based on the list. On the other hand, the important
features can be selected as key attributes to be monitored by
network supervisors. If those attributes change abnormally, the
attacks can be detected quickly.
V. CONCLUSION
As autonomous vehicles and connected vehicles are vul-
nerable to various cyber-attacks, IDS is one of the efficient
solutions to detect the launched network attacks and secure the
vehicle networks. In this paper, we presented an IDS based
on tree-based machine learning algorithms to detect threats
both on CAN bus and external networks. The SMOTE over-
sampling method and tree-based averaging feature selection
approaches were also introduced to reduce the impact of class
imbalance and computational cost. To evaluate the proposed
IDS, it was tested on two data sets for both intra-vehicle
and external networks. The results on both data sets show
that the proposed system has 2-3% higher accuracy, detection
rate, F1 score and lower false alarm rate than the methods
proposed in the literature. Moreover, unlike other proposed
methods, our work combines all the subsets of the data sets
and develops an IDS that can detect various attacks instead of
only single type of attack on each run. The accuracy of CAN
intrusion and CICIDS2017 data set reaches 100% and 99.
86%, while the computational time was reduced by 73.7% to
325.6s and by 38.6% to 2774.8s, respectively. In future work,
the results of the proposed IDS on CICIDS2017 data set can
be further improved by using optimization techniques such as
particle swarm optimization and Baysian optimization to tune
the hyper-parameters of the proposed algorithms.
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